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Abstract 
Many studies of state politics hold that a governor's success 
in his or her dealings with the state's legislature is at its 
height during the executive's initial legislative session and then 
decreases as the final year approaches. The purpose of this paper 
is to examine the validity of this generally accepted assumption. 
This thesis tests the hypothesis that governor's serving out the 
concluding year of their te:nn are lame ducks. An analysis of the 
legislative passage and amendment rates of two Governors of 
Virginia, Gerald Baliles (1986-1989) and L. Douglas Wilder (1990-
1993), during their first and last years reveals that lame duck 
theory is suspect. Both of these executives achieved first and 
last year passage and amendment percentages which were more 
congruous than one might expect. Other variables besides Governor 
Baliles and·Wilder's time in office affected their ability to gain 
the passage of their legislative proposals. 
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Lame Duck Theory l 
Introduction 
The foundations of lame duck theory, the expression connoting 
the study of executive/legislative relations in association with 
tenure constraints, are composed of broad generalizations which 
are generally unchallenged by political scientists. Evidence in 
support of this assertion is scattered throughout relevant 
literature, most of which centers upon the national executive, the 
two-term limitation imposed by the Twenty Second Amendment, and 
the subsequent lack of influence our country's presidents wield as 
their "political capital dwindles" proportionate with the temporal 
progress of their second term {Grossman, 1990, 221; see also 
Cronin, 1975; Nice, 1986; and Thomas, 1988). Interestingly, while 
a great deal of time and energy has been devoted to the discussion 
of the lame duck president, 11 very little has been done to analyze 
systematically" the lame duck governor {Gross, 1989, 778; see also 
Dometrius, 1987). As such, "our understanding of the governor's 
ability to influence legislative action and policy-making" as the 
conclusion of his/her term approaches "remains highly speculative 
and individualized." {Gross, 1989, 778; see also Schlesinger, 
1972) 
Theorists routinely adhere to the basic tenets of the lame 
duck doctrine. Many maintain that although one might expect 
executives in the final year of their tenure to be more adept at 
"building successful coalitions with the network of executive 
departments, agencies" and legislatures due to the increased 
amount of time they have served in off ice and their resulting 
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familiarity with its intricacies, in reality all executives 
experience "a kind of natural cycle, a decline in quality in the 
twilight of the administration." {Grossman, 1990, 218-219; see 
also Ransome, 1982) As such, those who accept the doctrine's 
tenets view the lame duck executive, defined as an individual 
operating within the final year of his/her term who is 
constitutionally restricted from seeking reelection, as being in a 
less influential position. They contend that executives are 
victims of an evolutionary, cyclical process which, regardless of 
their efforts, eventually restricts their resources and inhibits 
their ability to "impose their will on .... the rest of the 
political community in policy disputes." {Grossman, 1990, 226; see 
also Ransome, 1982; and Schlesinger, 1972) Thus, the lame duck 
executive may be politically impotent, for limited tenure 
presumably reduces the executive's leverage over other politicians 
as their "resources for bargaining and coalition building" wane 
{Thomas, 1988, 501). 
This project, while not the first to question the soundness 
of lame duck theory, makes an important contribution by providing 
a systematic analysis of lame duck theory at the state leve1.1 By 
analyzing the executive success rates, defined as the ability of 
the head of state to initiate and gain the passage of their 
i: Beyle, 1983; crew, 1992; Dometrius, 1987; Gross, 1989; Jewell, 1972; and 
Sigleman & Dometrius, 1988, have corrunented on the notion that there are 
many variables to consider if one is attempting to investigate 
gubernatorial/legislative relations in general. Also, Steven D. Johnson 
(1990) noted that former Virginia Governor Chuck Robb's effectiveness 
increased as his term progressed. But none of the above attempt to 
evaluate systematically the effects of the variables analyzed here 
during the governor's final year in office. 
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executive package,2 of two of Virginia's recent Governors, Gerald 
Baliles (1986-1989) and L. Douglas Wilder (1990-1993), I will 
attempt to illustrate that an executive's success in his or her 
dealings with the state legislature toward the end of their tenure 
is not wholly dependent upon the electoral limitations and the 
executive's lame duck status (Jewell, 1972) .3 Rather, it is 
hypothesized that despite the constraints cited in lame duck 
theory, during a governor's final year in office executive success 
still hinges on other critical variables associated with 
executive/legislative relations: the governor's future ambitions, 
personality traits and leadership skills, and the political 
environment - the fiscal situation, the executive's agenda, 
gubernatorial popularity, electoral results, and the partisan 
arrangement of the legislature. 
2: The executive package consists of the bills formally introduced into the 
legislature by the governor and those agencies and departments under his 
direct control and supervision. 
3, As I point out further along in the thesis, "success" can be defined in a 
variety of ways. Yet the controversy over the term does not undermine 
the conception offered here. While my definition may be challenged on 
the grounds that not all aspects of the executive package are equally 
important, it does include the most extensive set of items in the 
executive package and I do break down the package by issue area to 
enrich the analysis. So, while no single conception of "success" is 
absolute, my definition is legitimate for the purpose of testing the 
lame duck hypothesis. 
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Lame Duck Theo:r::y 
The decentralization movement fostered under Presidents 
Reagan and Bush resulted in the displacement of the federal 
government as the primary policy-maker on a host of domestic 
issues {Rosenthal, 1990). Consequently, states were forced to 
assume a greater portion of the burdens previously attended to by 
their national counterpart. While most states vigorously accepted 
this responsibility, becoming the new "locus of initiatives in 
education, public welfare, the environment, growth management and 
other areas," those who adhere to lame duck theory doubt the 
ability of an executive serving out their final year to operate 
effectively within this new arena {Rosenthal, 1990, 1). One study 
that takes this view wonders if outgoing governors are equipped 
with the power and resources necessary to establish "policies 
which govern the day to day operations of the executive 
branch .... secure policy coordination among the agencies which make 
up the executive branch .... and assume formerly national 
responsibilities {Ransome, 1982, 171). 
Not surprisingly, those who accept lame duck theory are quick 
to answer the above inquiries negatively. Their disconsolate 
assertions are(usually of the ensuing variety: 
It would seem that the four year term with no bar to 
succession •... would give the governor a boost in his role in policy 
formation. The governor needs to stay in off ice for more than four 
years primarily so that he can build a legislative bloc to support his 
program. His power is generally at its height during the first 
legislative session but tends to go downhill in subsequent sessions in 
those states where the governor cannot succeed himself. However, if 
there is a strong possibility that the governor may succeed himself, 
legislators tend to pay more attention to the governor's program and to 
be more receptive to his viewpoint (Ransome, 1982, 170-171). 
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Interestingly, it is not difficult to isolate the generalizations 
presented as fact. When Ransome says that "the governor needs to 
stay in off ice for four more years primarily so that he can build 
a legislative bloc to support his program," he ignores 
an assortment of variables which influence the 
executive/legislative relationship. These unexplored factors 
include whether the proposed program is controversial, the 
legislative strength of the governor's party, whether the package 
has tendered public support and publicity, and/or the executive's 
persuasive and leadership abilities. While not exhaustive, this 
catalog of variables reveals the limitations of lame duck theory: 
it rests on isolated suppositions dependent on the amount of time 
spent in off ice rather than a host of other pertinent variables 
which effect gubernatorial/legislative relations. 
Scholars of state politics have begun to question the 
soundness of theories which disregard a wide array of applicable 
factors (Crew, 1992; Demetrius, 1987; Gross, 1989; and Sigleman & 
Demetrius, 1988). Many acknowledge that as the electorate 
increasingly turns its eyes inward and calls upon the states to 
meet the demands neglected by the national government, the status 
and obligations of the states will continue to increase. 
Consequently, the competence and skill of governors and 
legislators deserve more attention in analyses of 
executive/legislative relations. As such, now is the time for 
analyses which question simple theories and off er alternative 
explanations of gubernatorial/legislative relations. "The point 
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seems very simple. If we do not consider such infonnation •... we 
simply cannot systematically evaluate" executive success (Gross, 
1989, 780). 
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Lame Duck Theory and Virginia's Governors 
Virginia's governors operate within the confines of a single-
term rule which precludes them from inunediately succeeding 
themselves. 4 This fact makes Virginia an appropriate state to 
examine if one seeks to investigate the limitations of lame duck 
theory. Furthermore, since the formal powers afforded the 
executive and legislative branches are roughly balanced, the 
conclusions derived from this study have wider application to 
states where the executive, while not confined to a single-term, 
confronts an equally empowered legislature, is limited to two 
successive terms and/or announces that he/she will not be seeking 
reelection prior to the conclusion of his/her tenure.s Those who 
agree with lame duck theory would claim that the one term limit 
without the possibility of succession would certainly result in 
the continual decline of the governor's success rates. We turn 
now to two specific cases, Gerald Baliles and L. Douglas Wilder, 
to test the validity of the lame duck hypothesis.6 
Governor Gerald Baliles, 1986-1989 
In 1985, Virginia's Democratic party "constructed a precedent-
4: Kentucky also limits its governors to a single-term. 
s: Alan Rosenthal's characterization of the Virginia political scene sums up 
the governmental symmetry of the legislative and executive branches: 
"the governor .•.. is institutionally strong, partly because Virginia's 
political culture is a deferential one, with considerable respect 
accorded to the chief executive. Yet Virginia's political elites have a 
keen sense of institutional boundaries, so the legislature can reign in 
its domain while the governor reigns in the executive domain. For the 
most part, lines are not crossed, and power is wielded subtly and shared 
amicably between the two branches." (Rosenthal, 1990, 197-198) 
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breaking, historic ticket that for the first time included a black 
and a woman" (Sabata, 1987, 6l). Led by Gerald Baliles (the 
previous administration's Attorney General), L. Douglas Wilder and 
Mary Sue Terry, the Democrats hoped to gain their second straight 
sweep of the three statewide offices - governor, lieutenant 
governor and attorney general. The recurring question was whether 
the "Old Dominion" was prepared to support such a revolutionary 
move. 
When the ballots were tallied, Baliles had received 55.2% of 
the votes cast, and became the "first gubernatorial candidate 
since Democrat Albertis s. Harrison in l96l to carry all ten 
congressional districts." (Sabata, 1987, 71) His running mates, 
having "wrapped themselves in traditional Virginia 
values .... conducted sedate and subdued campaigns .... and embraced 
the moderate-conservatism of .... their ticket leader," secured the 
Democratic sweep, with Douglas Wilder and Mary Sue Terry capturing 
5l.8% and 61.4% of the vote respectively (Sabata, 1987, 102). 
These results signaled the "coming of age of the new Democratic 
party of Virginia - a moderate party forged in the wilderness of 
twelve fruitless years, a party that has turned away from liberal 
extremes and toward centrism, a party that once again is whole and 
financially healthy rather than splintered and broke." {Sabata, 
1987, l07) 
6: This examination will compare the governor's first and last years in office 
because most who adhere to the lame duck doctrine also feel that the 
initial year ought to coincide with the executive's strongest 
legislative showing. Consequently, if lame duck theory is verifiable, 
the first and last year executive success rates should be highly 
disparate. 
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Buoyed by these electoral successes, the state's advantageous 
fiscal situation and the priceless endorsement of party favorite 
and gubernatorial predecessor Charles S. Robb, Governor Baliles 
seemed poised for a highly successful first year in office.7 Add 
to the favorable political environment a 2 to l Democrat advantage 
in the House of Delegates and a 4 to l margin in the state Senate, 
and one would expect Governor Baliles to pass the bulk of his 
executive package. 
Tables l and 2 document his impressive performance. In 1986, 
Baliles' first year as Governor, the executive package consisted 
of 118 bills, of which 82 were introduced in the House of 
Delegates and 36 into the Senate. He lost only 4.24% [5] of his 
package either to continuation of the legislation to the 1987 
session or death on the Assembly floor. Further, fewer than half 
of the bills were amended [58] while only 18.6% [22] were altered 
by both houses.a The most volatile portion of the package proved 
to be the 39 Human Resource bills, initiatives which account for a 
large portion (19.5%/23) of the governor's total amendment rate 
(49.2%/58). With most governors deemed successful if their 
passage rate approaches 80.0% (Rosenthal, 1990, 113), Governor 
Baliles' 95.8% rate confirms that 1986 was a good year for 
executive/legislative relations in Virginia, with a minimum amount 
of bills being killed or continued while few proposals were 
seriously amended.9 
Baliles' final year in office (1989), in contrast to 1986, 
7: Virginia's general fund budget increased by 10% for the fourth straight 
year (Harris & Tapscott, 1992). 
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- Table l: Governor Gerald Baliles, 1986 Legislative Session: 
Passage Rate: 95.76% I Amendment Rate: 49.2% 
*Total Number of Bills Introduced: 118 
*Number Introduced into the House of Delegates: 82 
*Number Introduced into the State Senate: 36 
*Number of Duplicate Bills: O 
- Number of Bills 
Amended in House 
of Origin Only 
- Number of Bills 
Amended in Second 
House Only 
- Number of Bills 
Amended in Both 
Houses Only 
- Number of Bills 
Killed 
- Number of Bills 
Continued 
- Total Number of 
Bills Amended® 
House 
21 I 25.6% 
4 I 4.90% 
13 I 15.9% 
2 I 2.44% 
3 I 3.66% 
38 I 46.3% 
Senate Totals 
4 I ii.1% 25 I 2i.2% 
1 I 19. 4% 11 I 9.32% 
9 I 25.0% 22 I 18.6% 
o I 0.00% 2 I 1.69% 
o I 0.00% 3 I 2.54% 
20 I 55.6% 58 I 49.2% 
®: Total Number Amended calculated by adding the first three lines. 
Source: 1986 Legislative Session Documents, Division of Legislative 
Services Library 
a: The tables account for the total number of amended bills, not the total 
number of amendments. This proved to be a reliable measure of 
legislative activity, for the total number of amendments for the four 
years surveyed was 240, only 11 greater than the total number of amended 
bills [229) . 
9: Following the 1986 legislative session, Governor Baliles achieved what many 
observers believe to be his greatest legacy. In a special legislative 
session held in October, 1986, the governor was able to push through 
record tax increases to pay for a mammoth road building plan (12-year, 
$12 billion construction program) which ended the state's antiquated 
11 pay-as-you-go 11 financing of roads, bringing the "'New Dominion• up to 
speed" (Melton, January 15, 1989, Bl). This was the zenith point of the 
highly successful first year. 
-Table 2: 
:Governor Baliles, 1986 
*Breakdown 
Number of 
Bille 
Amended in 
House of 
Origin only 
Trane. & Public 8.47% 
Safety (40 Bille) (10) 
Human Resources 5. 93% 
(39 Bille) (7) 
Commerce & Trade 3.39% 
(17 Bille) (4) 
Administration 2.54% 
(10 Bille) (3) 
Finance 0.85% 
(7 Bille) (1) 
Education 0.00% 
(5 Bille) (0) 
Total: 21. 2% 
(25) 
Legislative 
of Executive 
Number of 
Bille 
Amended in 
Second House 
only 
0.00% 
(0) 
5.93% 
(7) 
0.85% 
(1) 
0.85% 
(1) 
0.85% 
(1) 
0.85% 
(1) 
9.32% 
(11) 
Session: 
Package: 
Number of 
Bille 
Amended in 
Both 
Houses only 
5.10% 
(6) 
7.63% 
(9) 
1.69% 
(2) 
2.54% 
(3) 
0.00% 
(0) 
1.69% 
(2) 
18.6% 
(22) 
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Number of 
Bille 
Killed or 
Continued 
3.39% 
(4) 
0.85% 
(1) 
0.00% 
(0) 
0.00% 
(O) 
0.00% 
(0) 
0.00% 
(0) 
4.24% 
(5) 
Total 
Number of 
Bille 
Amended 111 
13.6% 
(16) 
19. 5% 
( 2 3) 
5.93% 
(7) 
5.93% 
(7) 
1.69% 
(2) 
2.54% 
(3) 
49.2% 
(58) 
®: Totals Calculated by Adding Number of Bills Amended in House of Origin 
Only, Second House Only and Both Houses Only 
Source: 1986 Legislative Session Documents, Division of Legislative 
Services Library 
was a year in which the lofty expenditures associated with the 
1980's led Virginia and the rest of the country to the brink of 
an economic downturn. The state's annual 10% budget increase came 
to a halt and personal income for married couples declined by over 
2%, the first drop since 1983 and the biggest since 1979 (Harris & 
Tapscott, 1992) .10 These economic indicators did not bode well for 
io: The 89'-90' Budget, drafted in the fall of 1988, showed a slight 4.0% 
increase in Virginia's general fund budget. In contrast, the prior 
Budget, drafted in the fall of 1987, depicted a 17.0% increase for the 
88'-89' fiscal year (Va. Department of Taxation, Tax Policy Section). 
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Governor Baliles' chances of expanding his agenda in the upcoming 
legislative session: 
When times are good and revenues are mounting governors have the where-
withal to propose far reaching policy agendas .... when times are bad and 
revenues are in decline .•.. they must focus substantial energies on 
coping with economic crisis. The amount of fiscal resources available, 
in short, forces governors to set priorities and also constrains their 
ambitions (Rosenthal, 1990, 99). 
Thus, even though he still maintained a 2 to l Democrat to 
Republican advantage in the House of Delegates and a 3 to l margin 
in the Senate, according to a member of Baliles' staff, the 
inauspicious economic climate 11was somewhat of a concern. For the 
first time, we felt as if our capital resources were limited. 
These indicators dictated that we restrict our ambitions and 
narrow our agenda. "ll (Staff Interview, 4/13/94) 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 indicate that despite the fiscal 
constraints, and contrary to what lame duck theory would have us 
believe, Governor Baliles did not experience a significant 
reduction in his ability to gain legislative support of his 
executive package. Tables 3 and 4, akin to Tables l and 2, show 
that 97.14% [68] of the bills introduced by the governor were 
passed. Meanwhile, the amendment rate actually declined from 
49.2% [58] in 1986, to 47.1% [33] in 1989. 
Table 5 charts the success of the governor's Finance and 
Appropriations proposals highlighted in Table 4. To summarize, in 
an attempt to give localities more revenue options, the governor 
submitted a package which allowed local governments to impose an 
u, Some of the material contained within this work was obtained by the author 
in interviews with two former Deputy Secretarys, two members of both 
Gerald Baliles• and L. Douglas Wilder's administrative staff and a high 
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-Table 3: Governor Gerald Baliles, 1989 Legislative Session: 
Passage Rate: 97.14% I Amendment Rate: 47.1% 
*Total Number of Bills Introduced: 70 
*Number Introduced into the House of Delegates: 49 
*Number Introduced into the State Senate: 21 
*Number of Duplicate Bills: 7 
- Number of Bills 
Amended in House 
of Origin Only 
- Number of Bills 
Amended in Second 
House Only 
- Number of Bills 
Amended in Both 
Houses Only 
- Number of Bills 
Killed 
- Number of Bills 
Continued 
- Total Number of 
Bills Amended® 
House 
10 I 20.4% 
3 I 6.12% 
9 I 18.4% 
3 I 6.12% 
o I 0.00% 
22 I 44.9% 
Senate Totals 
2 I 9.52% 12 I 17.1% 
5 I 23.8% 8 I 11.4% 
4 I 19.0% 13 I 18.6% 
2 I 9.52% 2 I 2.86%® 
o I 0.00% o I 0.00% 
11 I 52.4% 33 I 47 .1% 
®: Total Number Amended calculated by adding the first three lines. 
®: Number Decreases Because of Surviving Duplicate Bills 
Source: 1989 Legislative Session Documents, Division of Legislative 
Services Library 
income tax to finance future transportation expenditures. This 
unusual and politically risky gambit sparked many partisan and 
nonpartisan debates (Staff Interview, 9/13/93). But in the end, 
this initiative, while amended somewhat extensively (64.7%/11), 
achieved a passage rate of 100.0%. 
11: ranking member of the Department of Planning and Budget's Legislative 
services branch. Hereinafter, these are referred to as "Staff 
Interviews" followed by the date on which they were conducted. 
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- Table 4: 
:Governor Baliles, 1989 Legislative Session: 
*Breakdown of Executive Package: 
Number of 
Bills 
Amended in 
House of 
Number of Number of 
Bills Bills 
Amended in Amended in 
Second House Both 
Origin Only Only Houses Only 
Finance & Appro-
priations (17 Bills) 
Health & Human 
Resources (17 Bills) 
Trans. & Public 
Safety (16 Bills) 
Economic Develop-
ment (9 Bills) 
Natural Resources 
(7 Bills) 
Administration 
(3 Bills) 
Education 
(1 Bill) 
8.57% 
(6) 
2.86% 
(2) 
2.86% 
(2) 
0.00% 
(0) 
2.86% 
(2) 
0.00% 
(0) 
0.00% 
(0) 
Total: 17.1% 
(12) 
4..30% 
(3) 
1.43% 
( 1) 
1.43% 
(1) 
1.43% 
{l) 
1.43% 
(1) 
0.00% 
(0) 
1.43% 
(1) 
11.4% 
(8) 
2.86% 
(2) 
4.30% 
(3) 
4.30% 
(3) 
4.30% 
(3) 
1.43% 
{l) 
1.43% 
(1) 
0.00% 
(0) 
18.6% 
(13) 
Number of 
Bills 
Killed or 
Continued 
4.30% 
(3) 
0.00% 
(0) 
2.86% 
(2) 
0.00% 
(0) 
0.00% 
(0) 
0.00% 
(0) 
0.00% 
(0) 
2.86%* 
(2) 
Total 
Number of 
Bills 
Amended" 
15.7% 
( 11) 
8.57% 
(6) 
8.57% 
(6) 
5.71% 
{4) 
5.71% 
(4) 
1.43% 
(1) 
1.43% 
(1) 
47 .1% 
(33) 
®: Totals Calculated by Adding Number of Bills Amended in House of Origin 
Only, Second House Only and Both Houses Only 
*: Number Decreases Because of Surviving Duplicate Bills 
source: 1989 Legislative Session Documents, Division of Legislative 
Services Library 
These legislative tallies indicate that Governor Baliles did 
not experience a discernable abatement of executive success during 
the interim between his first and last years in off ice. While the 
1989 executive package contained 40.7% fewer bills than the 1986 
proposal, a decline attributed to the pessimistic fiscal 
forecast and the fact that "he (Baliles) J.lad introduced all the 
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- Table 5: Governor Baliles, 1989 Finance & Appropriations Package: 
Passage Rate: 100.0% I Amendment Rate: 64.7% 
*TOtal Number of Bills Introduced: 17 
*Number Introduced into the House of Delegates: 10 
*Number Introduced into the State senate: 7 
*Number of Duplicate Bills: 7 
- Number of Bills 
Amended in House 
of Origin Only 
- Number of Bills 
Amended in Second 
House Only 
- Number of Bills 
Amended in Both 
Houses Only 
- Number of Bills 
Killed 
- Number of Bills 
Continued 
- Total Number -of 
Bills Amended® 
House 
4 I 40.0% 
l I l0.0% 
2 I 20.0% 
2 I 20.0% 
o I 0.00% 
1 I 10.0% 
senate Totals 
2 I 20.6% 6 I 35.3% 
2 I 20.6% 3 I 17.6% 
o I 0.00% 2 I ll.8% 
l I 14.3% o I 0.00%® 
o I 0.00% o I 0.00% 
4 I s1.1% 11 I 64.7% 
®: TOtal Number Amended calculated by adding the first three lines. 
®: Number Decreases Because of Surviving Duplicate Bills 
Source: 1989 Legislative Session Documents, Division of Legislative 
Services Library 
legislation he deemed necessary, especially with it being a short 
legislative session," the executive success rates were virtually 
equal (Staff Interview, 9/13/93) .12 Further, the passage and 
amendment percentages of the most contested issues of 1986 and 
1989, the Human Resources and Finance and Appropriations packages 
respectively, were also analogous. The Human Resource bills 
i2: In odd calendar years, Virginia's legislative session is restricted to 
thirty calendar days. In even-numbered years, the legislative session 
is 60 calendar days. Both may be extended by another thirty days. 
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garnished a 97.44% passage rate and a 59.0% amendment rate, while 
the Finance and Appropriations package attained a 100.0% passage 
rate and a 64.7% amendment rate. 
Now, an analysis of Governor Baliles' final year would be 
incomplete if it failed to note the negative portrayal it received 
in the media. First, local journalists routinely questioned the 
legislative achievements of Governor Baliles, reporting that a 
number of amendments to the Finance and .Appropriations proposals 
drastically altered their effect.13 Also, in March, 1989, "the 
Supreme Court ruled that states must apply the same tax rules to 
federal pensions, which Virginia had been taxing, and state 
pensions, which it had not." (Baker, 1989, Bl) The ruling, which 
prevented states from taxing federal pensions if they did not 
treat other government retirees identically, "scuttled Virginia's 
pension-tax system." (Hardy, 1990, Al) This development caught 
the governor by surprise, forcing him to call a special 
legislative session in the fall of 1989. Unlike the preconceived 
and highly anticipated 1986 gathering, the reports of most 
journalists concluded that this special session ended in failure 
for the governor. In response, two former Deputy Secretary's 
challenged the conclusions of reporters. 
13: Amendments differ in the extent to which they alter the thrust and meaning 
of particular pieces of legislation. It is possible that some 
amendments do not affect the letter or spirit of a governor's particular 
legislative proposals, but certainly other amendments can cause dramatic 
changes. Governors can have proposals passed into law, but if those 
proposals are amended to the point where the governor's intent is 
damaged or lost altogether, can the proposal's passage truly be labeled 
a success for the governor? Queries like these lend credence to the 
assertion that executive success might be defined in a variety of ways. 
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The setbacks during the final special session were traceable to the 
fact that the problems which were dealt with were unexpected and 
somewhat unprecedented. The impetus for it came from outside the state 
and, because of the Court's penchant for time consumption, an early 
decision was not expected. The lack of forewarning caught both the 
governor and the state's legislators off-guard, and since neither knew 
exactly how to deal with the dilermna, a perceived •failure• was 
imminent. In reality though, the agreed upon solution was full of 
compromises more so than failures (Staff Interview, 10/1/93) • 
While the majority of the local media may have been less impressed 
with the •successes• of 1989, others broadened their field of vision, 
looked at the entire package and the atypical conditions surrounding the 
special session, and, consequently, portrayed our accomplishments in a 
more favorable light. The governor's office took that view and, 
when the dust settled, genuinely felt that while the 89' session was 
both a challenge and, at times, distressing, in the end, it was, 
overall, a •successful' experience. Even when one focuses on the 
amendments to the transportation sections of the appropriations bills, 
while the Assembly struck a blow by adding the requirement that the 
local voters would have to app~ove the levy, we (Governor Baliles and 
his staff) were OK with this because we knew that the very real 
possibility of a recession made the passage of a package calling for the 
mandatory imposition of another statewide tax a political impossibility. 
It was this, and not Baliles• 'lame duck' status, which forced us to 
accept the bills as amended in the Assembly. So, it's evident that 
•success• is a subjective term, largely defined by one's outlook, 
perspective and the criteria upon which conclusions are based (Staff 
Interview, 12/ 12/93) • 
The conflicting interpretations offered above illustrate the 
chief difficulty associated with defining executive success: while 
each view warrants consideration, it is impossible to detennine 
whether one supersedes the other. Yet, neither suggests that the 
governor's power declined because his tenn was approaching its 
conclusion. Thus, while the results of the 1989 session lend 
themselves to conflictual_ interpretations, it still appears that 
Governor Baliles confronted his final year and defied the tenure 
constraints allied against him. As such, it would be appropriate 
for one to ask how Governor Baliles was able to maintain his 
success percentages during his final session? Could enabling 
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variables, if skillfully implemented, empower an executive and 
pe:anit him or her to overcome the limitations of the electoral 
cycle? These queries will be explored after we review Governor 
Wilder's record. 
Governor L. Douglas Wilder, 1990-1993 
In 1985, L. Douglas Wilder campaigned for the position of 
Lieutenant Governor "not as a Jesse Jackson, concentrating his 
time and energy on the black community, but rather as 
a .... mainstream black candidate widely acceptable to whites." 
{Sabata, 1987, 84) In doing so, he was able to capture seven of 
ten congressional districts and 51.8% of the votes cast in spite 
of his many liabilities: 
His race, his liberal record on many social issues during fifteen years 
in the State Senate, and his personal problems (including a reprimand by 
the State Supreme Court for poor representation of a client, repeated 
late payment of taxes, and building code violations on some of his 
Richmond property) . Resentment also lingered in some quarters of the 
Democratic party because of his threat to bolt the party and run as an 
independent for the U.S. Senate in 1982 (Sabato, 1987, 104). 
Douglas Wilder's 1989 campaign for the governorship mirrored 
this previous effort. Unopposed for the position in his own 
party, Wilder's nomination still caused concern from "moderate-
conservative Democrats who were uneasy about the prospect. 
Wilder's continuing family feud with fo:aner Governor Charles Robb 
and his frequent disagreements with Governor Gerald Baliles only 
increased their anxiety." {Sabata, 1991, 62) But as the election 
drew near, the Democratic party rallied around their candidate, 
helping him to win the closest gubernatorial election of this 
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century by a mere .30% (or a total of 50.1% of the vote). Thus, 
although Governor Wilder was "beautifully positioned for battle: 
he was unopposed for the nomination, enjoyed the support of a 
united party reconciled to his run, was well financed, reigned as 
heir apparent to two popular administrations, won the 
preponderance of editorial endorsements, and ran a shrewd 
campaign .... he barely won." (Sabata, 1991, 100) 
Once in office, Governor Wilder viewed his initial 
legislative session with a modicum of apprehension. While he 
enjoyed the benefits of first year executive status and a partisan 
advantage of 59 Democrats to 39 Republicans in the House of 
Delegates and 30 Democrats to 10 Republicans in the senate, his 
narrow electoral victory and lack of vigorous intra-party support 
showed that he did not command the same level of deference 
afforded his Democratic predecessor. Furthermore, the state's 
fiscal situation continued to decline. In 1990, Virginia 
experienced its first decrease in the general fund budget in ten 
years and the elimination of 40,200 private sector jobs. 
Consequently, when he came into office in January of 1990, 
Governor Wilder acknowledged that the state needed to "bite the 
bullet" and institute "substantial budgetary cuts" geared 
towards rationalizing and scaling back the expenditure advances 
made during the Robb-Baliles years (Slipek, 1990, 16; see also 
Harris & Tapscott, 1992; and Morris, 1992). He focused his 
initial legislative agenda accordingly. 
Tables 6 and 7 document his 1990 perfonnance. While his 
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- Table 6: Governor L. Douglas Wilder, 1990 Legislative Session: 
Passage Rate: 94.26% I Amendment Rate: 55.7% 
*Total Number of Bills Introduced: 122 
*Number Introduced into the House of Delegates: 69 
*Number Introduced into the State senate: 53 
*Number of Duplicate Bills: 12 
- Number of Bills 
Amended in House 
of Origin Only 
- Number of Bills 
Amended in Second 
House Only 
- Number of Bills 
Amended in Both 
Houses Only 
- Number of Bills 
Killed 
- Number of Bills 
Continued 
- Total Number of 
Bills Amended® 
House 
23 I 33.3% 
6 I 8. 70% 
8 I ll. 6% 
2 I 2.90% 
l I 1.45% 
37 I 55.2% 
Senate Totals 
lo I 18.7% 33 I 27. 0% 
8 I 15.1% 14 I 11.5% 
13 I 24.5% 21 I 17.2% 
6 I ll.3% 5 I 4.10%® 
l I l.89% 2 I l.64% 
31 I 58.5% 68 I 55.7% 
®: Total Number Amended calculated by adding the first three lines. 
®: Number Decreases Because of Surviving Duplicate Bills 
source: 1990 Legislative Session Documents, Division of Legislative 
Services Library 
percentage of bills amended (55.7%/68) exceeded the 49.2% (58] 
posted by Governor Baliles in 1986, the new governor still 
achieved a 94.26% (115] passage rate. Included within this 
executive package were 28 Finance bills aimed at drastically 
reducing Virginia's $181 million revenue short fall and the 
subsequent creation of a moneta:ry reserve. As the economy slowed 
and personal income dropped, partisan rhetoric grew more heated 
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- Table 7: 
:Governor Wilder, 1990 Legislative Session: 
Trane. & Public 
Safety (32 Bills) 
Finance 
(28 Bille) 
Econanic Develop-
ment (27 Bille) 
Health & Human 
Resources (17 Bille) 
Natural Resources 
(10 Bille) 
Administration 
(5 Bille) 
Education 
(3 Bille) 
*Breakdown of Executive Package: 
Number of Number of Number of Number of 
Bille Bille Bille Bille 
Amended in Amended in Amended in Killed or 
House of Second House Both Continued 
Origin Only Only Houses Only 
8.20% 
(10) 
7.38% 
( 9} 
7.38% 
(9) 
3.28% 
(4) 
0.82% 
(1) 
0.00% 
(0) 
0.00% 
(0) 
2.46% 
(3) 
2.46% 
(3) 
1.64% 
(2) 
1.64% 
(2) 
0.82% 
(1) 
1.64% 
(2) 
0.82% 
(1) 
2.46% 
(3) 
5.74% 
(7) 
2.46% 
(3) 
4.10% 
(5) 
2.46% 
(3) 
0.00% 
(0) 
0.00% 
(0) 
1.64% 
(2) 
2.46% 
(3) 
0.82% 
(1) 
0.00% 
(0) 
0.82% 
(1) 
2.46% 
(3) 
0.00% 
(0) 
Total: 27 • O % 
(33) 
ll.5% 
(14) 
17 .2% 
(21) 
5.74%* 
(7) 
Total 
Number of 
Bille 
Amended@ 
13.1% 
(16) 
15.6% 
(19) 
ll.5% 
(14) 
9.02% 
(ll) 
4.10% 
(5) 
1.64% 
(2) 
0.82% 
(1) 
55.7% 
(68) 
®: Totals Calculated by Adding Number of Bills Amended in House of Origin, 
Second House Only and Both Houses Only 
*: Number Decreases Because of Surviving Duplicate Bills 
Source: 1989 Legislative Session Documents, Division of Legislative 
Services Library 
and the importance of these measures grew (Hardy, 1990). The 
analysis showed that of the 28 bills, while 67.9% [19] were 
amended, the package was passed in full. Therefore, Governor 
Wilder's first year, and presumably his strongest, saw the 
attainment of an enviable passage percentage but a less favorable 
amendment rate. 
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Wilder's final legislative session (1993), bore witness to 
yet another Virginia governor choosing his last year in off ice to 
introduce into the Assembly controversial legislation. Governor 
Wilder incorporated a 14 point Violent Crime initiative into the 
127 bills comprising his executive package. Two of the 14 bills, 
HB 1592 and SB 670, (duplicate bills which recommended that 
individuals be restricted to the purchase of one hand gun per 
month), attracted national attention and media coverage. As the 
lobbyists for the National Rifle Association (NRA} swung into 
action, the 1993 session promised to play host to numerous 
political debates and battles. 
Tables 8, 9 and 10 map the fallout. Interestingly, when the 
executive's package is viewed in full {Tables 8 and 9), one again 
notices that while Governor Wilder's amendment rate (55.1%/70) 
exceeds the percentage posted by his predecessor, it is within 
0.6% of Governor Wilder's 1990 amendment rate (55.7%/68). Also, 
his passage rate still hovers slightly above 90.0% (90.6%/115), a 
proportion which many governors would treasure (Rosenthal, 1990). 
Lastly, Table 10 examines the governor's Violent Crime 
package. Though the discussions were intense and the 
confrontations volatile, 92.9% [26] of the bills were passed by 
the Assembly. Of the 28 measures, consisting of 14 duplicates, 
the legislature amended 71.4% [20]. While this number outpaces 
the amendment rates of Governor Baliles, it is comparable to 
Governor Wilder's Finance package percentage {67.9%/19) from the 
1990 legislative session. This comparison illustrates that, 
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- Table 8: Governor L. Douglas Wilder, 1993 Legislative Session: 
Passage Rate: 90.6% I Amendment Rate: 55.1% 
*Total Number of Bills Introduced: 127 
*Number Introduced into the House of Delegates: 82 
*Number Introduced into the State Senate: 45 
*Number of Duplicate Bills: 26 
- Number of Bills 
Amended in House 
of Origin Only 
- Number of Bills 
Amended in Second 
House Only 
- Number of Bills 
Amended in Both 
Houses Only 
- Number of Bills 
Killed 
- Number of Bills 
Continued 
- Total Number of 
Bills Amended® 
House 
21 I 25.6% 
1 I 8.54% 
17 I 20.1% 
9 I 11.0% 
o I 0.00% 
45 I 54.9% 
Senate Totals 
4 I 8.90% 25 I 19.7% 
9 I 20.0% 16 I 12.6% 
12 I 26. 1% 29 I 22.0% 
8 I 17.8% 12 I 9.45%® 
o I 0.00% o I 0.00% 
25 I 55.6% 10 I 55.1% 
®: Total Number Amended calculated by adding the first three lines. 
®: Number Decreases Because of Surviving Duplicate Bills 
Source: 1993 Legislative Session Documents, Division of Legislative 
Services Library 
similar to Governor Baliles, Governor Wilder's initial and final 
year box scores, defined as the percentage of bills amended, 
passed, killed, and continued, did not significantly fluctuate. 
These findings do not conform with the expectations of lame 
duck theory. The evidence reveals three important conclusions. 
First, neither governor experienced a passage rate below 90%. 
Second, while both chose to advance controversial legislation 
- Table 9: 
:Governor Wilder, 1993 Legislative Session: 
*Breakdown of Executive Package: 
Violent crime 
(28 Bille) 
Economic Develop-
ment (21 Bills) 
Public Safety 
(16 Bills) 
Health & Human 
Resources (14 Bills) 
Finance 
(12 Bills) 
Education 
(10 Bille) 
Natural Resources 
(8 Bille) 
Administration 
(7 Bille) 
Transportation 
(7 Bille) 
Ethics 
(4 Bille) 
Number of 
Bills 
Amended in 
House of 
Origin Only 
2.36% 
{ 3) 
4.72% 
(6) 
2.36% 
(3) 
3.94% 
(5) 
0.00% 
(0) 
2.36% 
(3) 
0.79% 
(1) 
0.009% 
(0) 
3.156% 
(4) 
0.00% 
(0) 
Total: 19.7% 
(25) 
Number of Number of 
Bille Bille 
Amended in Amended in 
Second House Both 
Only Houses Only 
2.36% 
(3) 
0.79% 
(l) 
0.79% 
(1) 
1.57% 
(2) 
0.79% 
(l) 
0.79% 
(l) 
1.57% 
(2) 
3.94% 
(5) 
0.00% 
(0) 
0.00% 
(0) 
12.6% 
(16) 
11.0% 
(14) 
0.79% 
(1) 
1.57% 
(2) 
0.00% 
(0) 
4.72% 
(6) 
1.57% 
(2) 
2.36% 
(3) 
0.00% 
(0) 
0.79% 
(l) 
0.00% 
(0) 
22.8% 
(29) 
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Number of 
Bille 
Killed or 
Continued 
3.15% 
(4) 
0.00% 
(0) 
2.36% 
(3) 
0.00% 
(0) 
3.94% 
(5) 
0.00% 
(0) 
0.79% 
(l) 
0.00% 
(0) 
0.00% 
(0) 
3.15% 
(4) 
9.45%* 
(12) 
Total 
Number of 
Bille 
Amended lit 
15.7% 
( 2 0) 
6.30% 
(8) 
4.72% 
(6) 
5.51% 
(7) 
5.51% 
(7) 
4.72% 
(6) 
4.72% 
(6) 
3.94% 
(5) 
3.94% 
(5) 
0.00% 
(0) 
55.1% 
(70) 
®: Totals Calculated by Adding Number of Bills Amended in House of Origin, 
Second House Only and Both Houses Only 
*: Number Decreases Because of Surviving Duplicate Bills 
Source: 1993 Legislative Session Documents, Division of Legislative 
Services Library 
their final year in office (Baliles' Finance & Appropriations 
package and Wilder's Violent Crime initiatives), a point when they 
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- Table 10: Governor Wilder, 1993 Violent Crime Package: 
Passage Rate: 92.86% I Amendment Rate: 71.4% 
*Total Number of Bills Introduced: 28 
*Number Introduced into the House of Delegates: 14 
*Number Introduced into the State Senate: 14 
*Number of Duplicate Bills: 14 
- Number of Bills 
Amended in House 
of Origin Only 
- Number of Bills 
Amended in Second 
House Only 
- Number of Bills 
Amended in Both 
Houses Only 
- Number of Bills 
Killed 
- Number of Bills 
Continued 
- Total Number of 
Bills Amended® 
House 
2 I 14.3% 
2 I 14.3% 
1 I 50.0% 
l I 1 .10% 
o I 0.00% 
11 I 78.6% 
Senate Totals 
l I 1.10% 3 I 10.7% 
l I 1.10% 3 I 10.7% 
1 I 50.0% 14 I 50.0% 
3 I 21.4% 2 I 1 .14%® 
o I 0.00% o I 0.00% 
9 I 64.3% 20 I 71.4% 
®: Total Number Amended calculated by adding the first three lines. 
®: Number Decreases Because of Surviving Duplicate Bills 
Source: 1993 Legislative Session Documents, Division of Legislative 
Services Library 
were theoretically assumed to be at their weakest, both witnessed 
the passage of these proposals. Third, their box score ratios 
remained remarkably consistent, with neither experiencing a 
notable decline at the conclusion of their tenure. In short, the 
typical outcomes associated with lame duck theory simply did not 
materialize during the legislative sessions. Neither governor was 
unable to build "a legislative bloc to support his program", nor 
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did either watch as their power went "downhill in subsequent 
sessions." (Ransome, 1982) What then does this mean for lame duck 
theory? 
Alternative Exp~anations for Gubernatorial Success 
It is obvious that the gubernatorial/legislative puzzle is 
not as simple and clear cut as the lame duck theory would have us 
believe. On the contrary, while governors face distinctive 
challenges during their final year in office, the analysis above 
suggests that such challenges are not necessarily insurmountable. 
Table 12 illustrates this point. Therefore, we must now go beyond 
the question of whether a governor can sustain his or her 
executive success rates over the course of their tenure and ask 
why some governors excel, consistently maintaining exemplary 
executive success percentages, while others might fall 
comparatively short. 
A governor's ability to deal successfully with the state 
legislature does not decline solely because they lack tenure 
potential or because they lack formal powers over administration, 
i.e. veto and budgetary power and appointive authority 
(Schlesinger, 1972). Instead, several studies argue that one 
reason governors do not succeed is that they "are apparently 
personally incapable or disinclined to use those powers that they 
do possess." (Sigleman & Demetrius, 1988, 158; see also Beyle, 
1983; and Gross, 1989) Since a "governor's relationship with and 
success in dealing with the legislature often determines the 
Lame Duck Theory 27 
- Table 12: Comparison of the First and Last Year - Baliles and Wilder: 
Entire Package Controversial Initiative 
Passage Amendment Bills Passage Amendment Bills 
Rate Rate Amended in Rate Rate Amended 
Both in Both 
Houses Houses 
Baliles 95.76% 49.2% 18.6% 97.44% 59.0% 20.5% 
let Year 
Bal ilea 97 .14% 47 .1% 18.6% 100.0% 64.7% 11.8% 
4th Year 
Difference +l.4% -2.1% 0.0% +2.6% +5.7% -8.7% 
Wilder's 94.26% 55.7% 17 .2% 100.0% 67 .9% 25.0% 
let Year 
Wilder's 90.60% 55.1% 22.8% 92.86% 71.4% 50.0% 
4th Year 
Difference -3.6% -0.6% +5.6% -7 .1% +3.5% +25.0% 
success" of the administration, "fonnal powers do relatively 
little to bolster a governor's influence where infonnal resources 
and charisma are lacking." (Beyle, 1983, 206; see also Sigleman & 
Demetrius, 1988, 157; and Gross, 1989) Therefore, executive 
success could dependon the governor's ability to utilize and 
manage fonnal power in dealin9,S with the legislature. This skill 
may be affected by the political environment and the particular 
aspirations and skills each governor brings to the office. 
Consequently, we should explore the hypothesis that personal 
traits, characteristics and skills, the political environment and 
future ambitions all effect the outcome of executive/legislative 
relations. 
Returning to the executives studied here, while there was 
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some speculation to the contrary, Governor Baliles did not possess 
the same future electoral ambitions as either Chuck Robb or 
Douglas Wilder. As a result, his behavior as governor lent itself 
to collaboration and consensus, a style of leadership favored by 
those who place the state agenda over personal objectives: 
When Baliles took over, it was widely known that he did not harbor the 
same ambitions as Robb, or, for that matter, Wilder. The possibility of 
a future national appointment was not out of the question, but, for the 
most part, we knew that he wanted to work for the state of Virginia with 
the democratically controlled General Assembly. He looked upon the 
Assembly as his partner. His equal. The primary goal of his 
administration was to work with this partner to construct an agenda 
geared towards improving the condition of the state, not furthering his 
own political aspirations (Staff Interview, 2/9/93) . 
This demeanor influenced Governor Baliles' dealings with the 
legislature. During his administration, he took great care to 
forge strong, personal relationships with the Assembly as a whole 
and many of· its individual representatives and leaders. To 
facilitate these friendships, Baliles, a fonner member of the 
House of Delegates, would often journey to the Assembly and 
consult with individual legislators. On other occasions, he went 
out of his way to give them and their branch credit for 
legislative accomplishments. By no means one dimensional, he was 
also highly adept at the politics of provision, rubbing elbows, 
massaging egos and granting perks and favors when 
necessary. Baliles' leadership style afforded the governor many 
successes, yielding dividends during his final, and most trying 
legislative session. 
To summarize, faced with the difficulties that accompany the 
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lame duck label, a factious Assembly, a short, odd-year 
legislative session and a troubling fiscal forecast, Governor 
Baliles was quick to narrow his agenda, focus his resources and 
propose the legislation developed under difficult fiscal 
conditions (Staff Interview, 2/9/93}. Remarkably, despite the 
fact that portions of his Finance and Appropriations proposals 
divided the Assembly, his overall amendment rate decreased 2.1% 
from 1986, his initial year in office, while his passage rate 
remained consistent (See Table 12}. To achieve these numbers, 
Governor Baliles practiced the politics of cooperation and 
compromise. 
Governor Baliles• successor was elected into office at a time 
when the political environment was tumultuous. "With 
controversies and crises looming on the budget and in 
transportation, education, mental health, rural housing and 
corrections," the new governor initially viewed his post with some 
apprehension (Sabata, 1991, 96} . But as the 1990 legislative 
session began, Governor Wilder boldly decided to forego the 
conciliatory techniques applied by his predecessor. "Eager to 
fashion a reputation as a fiscal conservative," a stance "clearly 
linked to his presidential ambitions," (Eckholm & Hinds, Al, 1991} 
and wary of appearing vulnerable during a period of economic and 
political uncertainty, he instead chose to assert his own ~ower 
and strength by introducing a series of controversial spending 
cuts and demanding that the Assembly act on his proposals (See 
also Harris & Tapscott, 1992; and Schapiro, 1990}. By refusing to 
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call for tax increases, he shrewdly thwarted G.O.P. attempts to 
label him as a free spending liberal, silenced those Democrats who 
felt that tax hikes were necessary but who faced reelection 
battles in 1991 and unabashedly attempted to transform "fiscal 
distress into a political asset." (Eckholm & Hinds, Al, 1991) At 
the end of the 1990 session, Governor Wilder had achieved a 
laudable passage rate and national recognition for his fiscal 
prudence, but his confrontational and somewhat self-serving stance 
left many wondering if the new governor's loyalties were misplaced 
(Associated Press, 1990; Eckholm & Hinds, 1991; and Hardy & 
Schapiro, 1990.). 
This first legislative session set the tone for the remainder 
of his administration, one which witnessed an aborted presidential 
bid, senatorial posturing for a possible 1994 Senate race and 
public approval ratings which fluctuated between 34% and 48% 
(Richmond Times Dispatch, Media Research Department) . 
Furthermore, the mid-term Assembly elections reduced the 
Democratic advantage by 10, from 61 to 59 in the House of 
Delegates and 30 to 22 in the Senate (Whelan, 1993, 4). 
Consequently, as his term progressed, the Assembly's increasing 
partisanship combined with Governor Wilder's contentious 
personality and leadership style to strain the congenial 
gubernatorial/legislative relationship enjoyed by his predecessor. 
Staff members routinely characterized him as a head of state who 
felt that "he alone knew what was best for Virginia." (Staff 
Interview, 2/9/93) Once Governor Wilder proposed his executive 
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package he felt that the legislative branch ought to implement 
his proposals without question. Those portions of his package 
which furthered his own interests and received national attention, 
like the 1993 Violent Crime initiatives, benefited from a more 
flexible governor who deviated from his confrontational stance if 
the move promoted the passage of the bill(s) (Staff Interview, 
2/9 /93) .14 
But, more often than not, the governor chose not to cooperate 
and compromise, preferring to remain obdurate in the face of a 
frequently less than amicable political environment. 
Consequently, it should come as no surprise that while the 
amendment and passage proportions achieved by Governor Wilder in 
his initial and final years in off ice parallel each other (Table 
12), a fact which undermines lame duck theory, his success rates 
do not equa~ those posted by Governor Baliles (Table 13). 
- Table 13: Comparison, Baliles and Wilder - First and Last Year Averaged: 
Baliles, 
1986 & 1989 
(188 Bills) 
Wilder 
1990 & 1993 
(249 Bills) 
Entire Package 
Passage 
Rate 
96.5% 
92.4% 
Amendment 
Rate 
48.1% 
56.1% 
Bills 
Amended 
in Both 
Houses 
18.6% 
20.0% 
Controversial Initiative 
Passage Amendment Bills 
Rate Rate Amended 
in Both 
Houses 
98.7% 61.8% 16.1% 
96.4% 69. 6% 37.5% 
14: To this end, washington Post reporters John Harris and Donald Baker report 
that Wilder's 1993 Violent Crime efforts ended in victory "according to 
legislators because in the final year of his administration he did what 
he steadfastly refused to do throughout the first three years: He 
identified an issue well before the session, carefully cultivated public 
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First, while Governor Wilder's passage rate for the entire 
package is within 5.0% of that posted by Governor Baliles, his 
amendment percentage exceeds his predecessor's by 8.0%. Secondly, 
and more significantly, a comparison of the controversial 
initiatives advanced by each shows that Governor Baliles• 
proposals sparked less negative legislative activity than did 
Governor Wilder's. Governor Wilder's amendment rate outpaces the 
Governor Baliles' by 7.8%, while his percentage of bills amended 
in both of the Assembly's houses is 37.5%, 21.4% greater 
than Governor Baliles• 16.1%. Therefore, while each was able to 
overcome the constraints of their final year, Governor 
Wilder's ability to gain the unrevised passage of his legislative 
proposals lagged behind that of his predecessor. These facts 
suggest that executive success depends upon an assortment of 
factors ranging from the personal skills, ambitions and agenda of 
the executive to the political environment - the fiscal situation, 
gubernatorial popularity, electoral results and the partisan 
arrangement of the legislature. Each of these factors, even 
during the concluding year of an executive's term, affects the 
passage and amendment rates of gubernatorial initiatives. 
14: support, then built a legislative majority through a mix of persuasion 
and compromise. In short, Wilder performed more like a traditional 
governor and less like a maverick outsider than in previous years. He 
no longer seemed more intent on rattling the establishment and going it 
alone than on affecting public policy." (Harris & Baker, 1993, Bl) 
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Conclusion 
All governors enter off ice and employ a particular strategy 
to guide their actions: 
To achieve their goals in the face of uncertainty, surprise, ambiguity, 
inadequate information, and centrifugal forces, public executives 
need .... a set of premises deliberately chosen to provide direction to 
their thinking, choices and administrative behavior (Crew, 1992, 24). 
Since "most studies of gubernatorial behavior focus on success in 
achieving policy purposes and how the governor develops and uses 
his or her political resources .... to achieve policy success", it 
stands to reason that the premises governors generate are geared 
towards dealing with the political environment and maximizing 
their potential for present and, if applicable, future success 
(Crew, 1992, 16). How each governor implements and coordinates 
these premises and objectives in the face of the structural and 
environmental hurdles he/she faces throughout their tenure and, 
especially, during their concluding year, is critical. If a 
governor proposes viable legislation, is comfortable with and 
respected by the legislature, enjoys face-to-face negotiations 
regularly and is the beneficiary of a relatively stable political 
environment, we would expect his or her passage and amendment 
rates to remain consistent. Conversely, the head of state who 
toils within a dynamic political environment, advances respected 
but occasionally highly contentious policy proposals and who finds 
it difficult to cooperate and compromise with the legislature 
would be more likely to record passage and amendment percentages 
which trail those posted by the executive delineated above and 
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are, comparatively, less congruous. 
These examples are a small sample of the myriad of 
combinations of variables which can affect 
gubernatorial-legislative relations and executive success rates. 
If one elects to address the notion of what constitutes executive 
success and, in doing so, contrasts the media's interpretations 
with those offered by political scientists, the picture becomes 
more muddled. Journalists tend to pen event driven renditions 
which focus on daily nuances, whereas political scientists seek to 
discern the relative importance of these nuances within the 
context of broader trends and general patterns of behavior. 
Consequently, while the data reviewed above suggests that it may 
be "inappropriate to fix a cycle of increasing or decreasing 
policy effectiveness for governors" (Johnson, 1990, 359), it 
neither pu~orts to off er the definitive word on the 
executive/legislative relationships analyzed here nor adequately 
explains why the success rates of Governors Baliles and Wilder 
remained relatively constant. The main objective throughout has 
been to show that discourse concerning lame duck theory needs to 
begin anew. Future examinations must account for and discuss the 
correlation between success and personal.skills, environmental 
considerations and future.political ambitions. Such studies would 
no longer be tempted to reduce the investigation of 
executive/legislative relations to any one factor, being obliged 
to address the dynamic interaction between a variety of variables. 
This thesis illustrates that those studies are necessary if we are 
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to move beyond the simple assumptions of lame duck theory and 
provide a fuller explanation of gubernatorial success with state 
legislators. 
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